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Abstract
We conduct experiments on earned wealth effects in dictator games. In addition to a standard treatment
in which wealth was determined by the experimenter, we conduct treatments in which the dictator or the
receiver earned the wealth used in the dictator game. In our baseline treatment, on average, dictators allocate
receivers 20 percent. In treatments where dictators earned wealth, we observe the (theoretically predicted)
zero offers to receivers. In treatments where receivers earned wealth, we observe distributions of offers in
which receivers’ shares exceeds 50 percent. These results emphasize the importance of property rights in
determining individuals’ social preferences.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C70; C91; D63
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1. Introduction
Experiments have demonstrated the presence of other-regarding or social preferences in which
individuals reveal a preference over not only their own payoffs, but also those of others. For
example, in simple dictator games where standard theory predicts zero offers to receivers, senders
typically offer in excess of 20 percent of their endowments (see Camerer, 2003). These results
are strikingly robust across varying degrees of anonymity (Hoffman et al., 1996) and different
cultures (Henrich et al., 2001; Roth et al., 1991). The insights gleaned from these experiments
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have motivated various theoretical approaches characterizing social preferences (Bolton and Ock-
enfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and the intentions underly-
ing individual behavior (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; McCabe and Smith, 2000; Rabin,
1993).
However, experimental participants’ displayed preferences for fairness, reciprocity, and social
welfare are multi-faceted, motivated by many aspects of the decision environment and the context
of interactions. As evidence, recent research has demonstrated how individuals’ attention to the
payoffs of others are influenced by antecedents in the decision environment. For example, Hoffman
and Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al. (1994) find that when individuals must earn their roles in an
experiment (e.g., earning the role of seller or first mover), the distribution of payoffs reflects the
fact that roles were earned. Thus, by having earned a position or role in an experiment, participants
appear to think that one is entitled to outcomes which, in other circumstances, may be considered
unfair. With respect to these perceived entitlements, Cherry et al. (2002), Cherry (2001) and
Ruffle (1998) find that payoff distributions in dictator and ultimatum games are influenced by the
source of wealth: individuals with legitimate claims to assets (having earned these assets) receive
larger shares than when endowments are determined by the experimenter (i.e., unearned). This
demonstrates how individuals’ perceptions of fairness and their attention to the payoffs of others
are attuned by behaviors leading up to (and the characteristics of) a decision environment.2
Here, we conjecture that the legitimizing of assets creates property rights which participants’
observe, regardless of who accumulates these rights. We test this conjecture in a series of dictator
games in which one party (either the dictator or the receiver) must earn the wealth used in the
game. Thus, our design includes that of Cherry et al. (2002, in which only dictators earned money)
as a special case. On the other hand, when receivers must earn money, our treatment mirrors a trust
game akin to that of Berg et al. (1995) in which a receiver’s exertion of (costly) effort indicates
trust in the dictator not expropriating wealth via a zero offer. Results from our earnings treatments
are compared to a standard (unearned wealth) dictator game treatment.
We find that property rights (created by legitimizing assets) play a crucial role in individuals’
revealed preferences over outcomes. In contrast to the standard dictator game, we observe the
theoretically predicted zero offer in treatments where dictators earn wealth. Alternately, when
receivers earn wealth dictators allocate significantly more, observing the entitlements or property
rights created by receivers’ productivity. Indeed half of the dictators return at least the amount
produced through receivers’ efforts. We attribute these decisions to the strength of asset legit-
imacy in creating observed property rights among participants, a characteristic of the decision
environment which appears to augment other-regarding or social preferences.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines our experiment. As a benchmark, we conduct a
canonical dictator game under anonymity against which we measure our other results. Section 3
presents our results. Section 4 discusses our results in terms of recent research on fairness, the
legitimacy of assets, and equity theory.
2. Experimental design
We conducted dictator games with 168 pairs recruited from the student body at the University
of Calgary. Participants were randomly divided into two groups (A and B) with each group arriving
2 Similar results are obtained by Bolton et al. (2005) and Gantner et al. (2001).
at different times and assigned to separate rooms.3 Participants remained in their assigned rooms
for the experiment’s duration, and each group was dismissed from the experiment at different
times. The objective of these procedures was to eliminate any contact between participants.
2.1. Earnings treatments
To create a sense of asset entitlement or legitimacy, some subjects participated in an earnings
stage prior to the dictator game. In our receiver earnings treatment (n = 83), individuals in group
B had the opportunity to generate (i.e., earn) money based on their performance on a 20 questions
exam culled from the Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT) and the Graduate Record
Examination (GRE). Specifically, if an individual correctly answered between 0 and 8 questions,
CAN$ 10 was generated; if she correctly answered between 9 and 14 questions, CAN$ 20 was
generated; and if she correctly answered 15 or more questions, CAN$ 40 was generated.
Individuals in group A arrived at a different location 45 min after group B. Individuals in
group A were provided with a copy of the exam taken by those in group B and the corresponding
payment schedule. Each individual in group A was randomly paired with an individual in group B
and informed of the amount of money generated by this person. Individuals in group A were not
informed of the exam score of this person, only the corresponding monetary amount. Individuals
in group A were then asked to allocate this earned wealth in a one-shot dictator game, deciding
how much of the money generated by an individual in group B would be kept for themselves and
how much would be returned to the individual who had earned the money.
In our dictator earnings treatment (n = 24), individuals in group A took the exam and faced
the aforementioned earnings structure. Earned wealth was used in the second stage where group
A individuals made offers to group B individuals who arrived 45 min later at a different location.
In our baseline treatment (n = 61), no exam was administered and group A dictators were
randomly assigned wealth levels of either CAN$ 10, CAN$ 20, or CAN$ 40 to allocate between
themselves and group B receivers. Groups A and B individuals knew wealth levels were ran-
domly determined. This followed previous experiments in which wealth was determined by the
experimenter.
3. Results
To begin, we consider the theoretical predictions from the above games. In all three treatments,
standard theory (based on pure self-interest) predicts that the dictator will allocate nothing to the
receiver. Hence, in the dictator earnings treatment, we expect dictators to produce as much wealth
as possible. In the receiver earnings treatment one would expect individuals in group B to produce
the lowest wealth level possible.4
3 Instructions and supporting materials are included in Oxoby and Spraggon (2004), available online. Our protocols
were adapted from those of Hoffman et al. (1996). To avoid semantic pointers, instructions refrained from using the word
“earned” to describe the money used in the dictator game.
4 There are at least three potential reasons that group B receivers may exert effort to produce wealth greater than CAN$
10. First, receivers may believe that dictators will recognize and respect their property rights over wealth created by their
productivity on the exam. Second, receivers may have preferences over efficiency (maximizing total group payoff) as
suggested by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Third, receivers may enjoy the challenge
of taking the test and may do well because they are good “test takers.” We are unable to distinguish between these three
explanations for why subjects may do better on the test. As a result we refer to a subject who does better on the test and
produces a higher wealth level as being more productive.
Fig. 1. Cumulative distributions of offers in the CAN$ 10 dictator games.
Table 1
Percentage offers by treatment and wealth level
Wealth (CAN$) Mean (percent) Median (percent) Offers between (percent)
0 percent 1–49 percent 50 percent 51–100 percent
Baseline dictator treatment
10 23.5 (4.717) [20] 20 35.00 35.00 30.00 0
20 20.22 (3.604) [23] 25 26.09 60.87 13.04 0
40 20 (3.776) [18] 18.75 11.11 77.78 11.11 0
Receiver earnings treatment
10 27.5 (7.665) [16] 20 37.50 25.00 25.00 12.50
20 46 (4.220) [35] 50 2.86 40.00 25.71 31.42
40 63.83 (3.663) [32] 75 0.00 15.63 15.63 62.86
Standard errors are in parenthesis and number of observations are in square brackets.
The cumulative distributions of offers by wealth level (CAN$ 10, CAN$ 20, and CAN$ 40)
are presented in Figs. 1–3.5 Fig. 4 compares the cumulative distributions across the three different
wealth levels for the receiver earnings treatment. Table 1 presents mean, median and percentage
offers from our baseline and receiver earnings treatments, and Table 2 provides the p-values for
Mann–Whitney tests on pair-wise comparisons of treatment cells.
In the baseline dictator treatments, the theoretically predicted “zero offer” occurred in 35
percent of CAN$ 10, 26 percent of CAN$ 20, and 11 percent of CAN$ 40 wealth levels. This
is consistent with previous dictator game experiments (see Table 2.4 in Camerer, 2003, p. 57).
Our dictator earnings treatment follows the theoretic prediction perfectly: 100 percent of dictators
allocated nothing to receivers (Figs. 3 and 4). This demonstrates the robustness of the results in
5 RE represents the receiver earnings treatment, DE represents the dictator (sender) earnings treatment, and baseline
represents the baseline (i.e., unearned wealth) treatment. We had no CAN$ 10 wealth levels for the dictator earnings
treatment; all dictators in this treatment earned at least CAN$ 20.
Fig. 2. Cumulative distributions of offers in the CAN$ 20 dictator games.
Fig. 3. Cumulative distributions of offers in the CAN$ 40 dictator games.
Cherry et al. (2002): legitimizing dictators’ claims over wealth increased the occurrence of the
theoretic prediction over the baseline treatment.6
Results from our receiver earnings treatment further demonstrate the importance of legitimate
property rights. To the extent that legitimizing assets created property rights, dictators in group
6 Moreover, none of our dictators in the dictator earnings treatments scoring less than 9 (the CAN$ 10 wealth level
cut-off) suggests that they exerted significant effort on the test.
Fig. 4. Cumulative distributions of offers in the receiver earnings treatments.
A observed the rights of those in group B by extending larger offers and, in some cases, offering
the entire amount of the money earned by the individual (i.e., 100 percent offers). Thus, legit-
imizing the receiver’s claim to the wealth via the earnings stage dramatically reduced dictators’
self-interested behavior, with zero offers arising in none (0 percent) of the CAN$ 40, one (3 per-
cent) of the CAN$ 20, and six (38 percent) of the CAN$ 10 wealth levels. This mirrors the effect
of asset legitimacy seen in our dictator earnings treatment: the property rights created by legit-
imizing assets yielded offer distributions which, relative to the baseline treatment, reflected these
rights.
Mann–Whitney tests indicate that there is a significant difference in the distributions of offers
(Figs. 2–4) between the receiver earnings and baseline treatments for the CAN$ 20 wealth level
(MW p < 0.01) and CAN$ 40 wealth level (MW p < 0.01), but not for the CAN$ 10 wealth
level (MW p = 0.88). That there is no significant difference between the baseline and receiver
earnings treatment for the CAN$ 10 wealth level emphasizes the role of legitimized property rights:
receivers who do not exert a verifiable level of effort are treated in the same way as receivers in the
baseline treatment. This is consistent with results in Berg et al. (1995) and McCabe et al. (2003):
Table 2
Non-parametric test summary
Baseline dictator Receiver earnings (RE)
CAN$ 10 CAN$ 20 CAN$ 40 CAN$ 10 CAN$ 20 CAN$ 40
Baseline CAN$ 10 0.8130 0.9056 0.8813 0.0013 0.0000
Baseline CAN$ 20 0.8620 0.8726 0.0001 0.0000
Baseline CAN$ 40 0.9582 0.0003 0.0000
RE CAN$ 10 0.0129 0.0001
RE CAN$ 20 0.0017
RE CAN$ 40
Mann–Whitney p-Values.
when dictators observed no verifiable evidence of receivers’ trust (here, earnings effort in the face
of potential expropriation), dictators do not reciprocate (i.e., extend larger offers) as with higher
wealth levels. This observation is evident in Table 1 where, in the baseline treatment, there are
no offers in excess of 50 percent.7 This stands in sharp contrast to the behavior of dictators in the
receiver earnings treatments where 13 percent, 31 percent, and 63 percent of dictators extended
offers exceeding 50 percent for the CAN$ 10, CAN$ 20, and CAN$ 40 wealth levels.
Building on these results, recall that receivers in our receiver earnings treatment were allocated
a minimum of CAN$ 10 (the minimum amount they could receive when scoring between 0 and
8 on the exam). Thus, one may interpret earnings as the wealth generated over and above CAN$
10. The fact that some receivers exerted any effort on the exam suggests that receivers expected
dictators to observe their property rights and behave reciprocally towards exam performance by
extending a larger offer than they would have had if earnings had been lower.8 Interpreting the
receiver earnings treatment in this way, it is notable that the modal offer is 50 percent for the
CAN$ 20 wealth level and 75 percent for the CAN$ 40 wealth level, exactly the amount that the
receiver earned over and above the CAN$ 10 allocated by the experimenter. These differences are
discernable in the distribution of offers (Fig. 4) and are supported by non-parametric tests (Table
2). This suggests that the observation of property rights is limited to the extent that the legitimacy
of these rights is verifiable. That is, only when receivers earned CAN$ 20 or CAN$ 40 were
dictators sure that receivers’ property rights were not simply determined by the experimenter.
These wealth levels provided dictators with evidence that these rights were legitimate in that the
receiver had increased the wealth available for the dictator to allocate.
Notice that in the receiver earnings treatment dictators could have interpreted the CAN$ 10
wealth level as evidence that a receiver had shirked on the exam. It is therefore interesting that the
distribution of offers in the CAN$ 10 receiver earnings and CAN$ 10 baseline treatments are not
statistically different (Fig. 1 and Table 2), implying no evidence of negative reciprocity in our data.
This results stands in contrast to intentions-based theories (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004) and menu-dependence (Bolton et al., 2005) which suggest that receivers would receive less
for only having generated CAN$ 10 (rather than CAN$ 20 or CAN$ 40). Thus, our results differ
from Ruffle (1998, p. 252) where “losing recipients are mildly punished.” A potential explanation
for the absence of negative reciprocity in our results may be the confounding of effort and ability
in dictators’ interpretation of receivers’ earnings. That is, upon encountering a receiver who
generated only CAN$ 10 on her exam, a dictator could not be sure if this score was the result
of low effort or low ability on the part of the receiver. Reciprocity based on punishing low effort
but not low ability may have reduced dictators’ desire to extend low offers to poor performing
receivers.9
4. Discussion
Property rights and asset legitimacy play a crucial role in decision-making, weighting and
characterizing individuals’ attention to the payoffs of others. Thus, the implications drawn from
7 This is also true in the baseline treatments from Cherry et al. (2002) and Ruffle (1998). Other dictator experiments
observe a small number of offers in excess of 50 percent. See Andreoni et al. (2003) and Forsythe et al. (1994).
8 As noted earlier, alternate explanations include that receivers have preferences over efficiency (Charness and Rabin,
2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), or that receivers enjoy the challenge of taking the test.
9 Refraining from punishing low ability is consistent with the “accountability principle” discussed in Konow (2000).
Also see McClintock and Keil (1982) and Walster et al. (1978).
more standard bargaining experiments regarding fairness concerns and inequity aversion should
be tempered against the influence of “found money” effects (Arkes et al., 1994; Thaler, 1999). As
demonstrated by our experiment and elsewhere, legitimizing assets can alter the ways in which
individuals construe equity and fairness, resulting in behaviors that appear to defy or magnify the
presence of social preferences.
In our experiment, we observe a dichotomous effect of earned wealth in the dictator game.
First, individuals’ own entitlements to assets appear to dominate over the fairness concerns char-
acterized in outcome based models of other-regarding preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Secondly, others’ entitlements to assets appear to amplify individu-
als’ observed adherence to the positive reciprocity characterized in intention-based models of
fairness (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993). Indeed, receivers’ earning efforts
reveal an expectation that dictators will observe the property rights implied by these efforts. Thus,
our experiment demonstrates how earned wealth effects influence outcome based fairness (which
disappears in our dictator earnings treatment) and intention based fairness (which appears to be
heightened in our receiver earnings treatment).
Legitimizing assets creates property rights which individuals in our experiments observed,
complementing the dictator experiments of Cherry et al. (2002) and Ruffle (1998). In Cherry et
al. (2002), dictators (not receivers) earned wealth via a 17 question exam. Legitimizing assets
in this way resulted in 70 percent (US$ 40) and 79 percent (US$ 10) support for the theoretical
zero offer.10 In Ruffle (1998) receivers were ranked by their performance on a general knowledge
quiz, with participants scoring above the median allocated US$ 10 and the remainder allocated
US$ 4. As in our results, Ruffle (1998) finds that offers made to receivers in the top of the score
distribution (mean offer 45 percent) exceed those made to receivers in the bottom of the score
distribution (mean offer 23 percent) and offers made in treatments in which endowments were
randomly assigned (mean offer 34 percent).
Our results provide stronger evidence as to the role of legitimized property rights in decision-
making. We conjecture that the strength of our results (particularly mean offers exceeding those in
Ruffle, 1998, see Table 1) is due to earnings based on absolute (rather than relative) performance
and the size of incentives. In particular, the use of absolute score to determine earnings implies that
(in our context) dictators have a stronger signal of receivers’ legitimate claim to assets. This yields
strong evidence of the importance of property rights (and the ensuing “gratefulness” of dictators
in respecting these property rights) in determining behavior. That receivers who produced greater
wealth were rewarded for this productivity, and the absence of any difference between offers
made to receivers earning CAN$ 10 and our CAN$ 10 baseline treatment, indicates that dictators’
observation of property rights only affected decision-making when there was ample evidence of
receivers’ legitimacy over assets.11
Equity theory provides a potential explanation for our results. According to equity theory,
people desire outcomes which they consider just, where a “just outcome” is measured both in
terms of the “output” of a given decision environment and the “inputs” giving rise to the decision
10 In our design, legitimizing assets on the part of the sender results in 100 percent support for the theoretical prediction.
Cherry et al. (2002) find 95 percent support for the theoretical prediction in a double-blind design. Similar results are
presented in Cherry (2001).
11 Other experiments find similar effects of asset entitlement. In Ga¨chter and Riedl (2005), bargaining pairs consider a
split of resources based on proportional (i.e., relative) performance as more fair than equal split allocations. Sonnegard
(1996, p. 372) finds that behavior in bargaining experiments is sensitive to framing effects in which property rights are
reinforced by reminding senders of their “right to exploit their bargaining power.”
environment (Konow, 2003; Walster et al., 1978). Thus, reward allocations are affected by the
parties’ contributions to the generation of total rewards (as discussed in Selten, 1978), implying
a role for sunk costs in the determination and application of fairness principles (as in Carmichael
and MacLeod, 2003). In our experiments, individuals’ decisions over the final distribution of
wealth were strongly affected by antecedent earnings behaviors (i.e., the inputs leading to a
wealth level which characterizes the decision environment). These behaviors created property
rights, the observation of which reflect individuals’ attentions to or desire for “just” outcomes.
Indeed, McClintock and Keil (1982) argue that when property rights are legitimately and credibly
determined in a social exchange environment, equity theory implies the observation of these
rights, regardless of the institutional structure enforcing these rights.
In our experiments, it was clear who provided these inputs and (in accord with equity theory)
we observed clear behavioral regularities in dictators’ decision-making (see Table 1 and Figs.
1–3). However, in more complex environments it is more difficult for decision makers to discern
what fairness ideal should apply, particularly when entitlements to wealth and property rights are
heterogeneous.12 These environments become even more complex when efficiency is affected by
incentives which, in turn, are a function of individuals’ preferences for equity. The key in such
environments is determining how equity concerns should be measured. However, once these con-
cerns are properly measured, there is evidence that fairness models can provide good predictions
of individual behavior (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2005; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann
and Strobel, 2004).
5. Conclusion
Many aspects of a decision environment influence how individuals perceive fairness in that
environment. Our experiments demonstrate how legitimized property rights affect individuals’
behaviors and their demonstrated preferences over outcomes. This points to a need to consider
the import of asset legitimacy in models of individual decision-making and the measurement of
“fair outcomes.” Here, legitimizing assets created property rights that individuals readily observed
in dictator games. These results should inform models of social preferences and reciprocity by
demonstrating an important aspect of how individuals construe fairness and evaluate the welfare
of others.
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